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The misinformation effect has long been studied, but little research has examined how 
misleading post-event information affects traumatic memory. Misinformation presented by a co-
witness has been found to be particularly powerful, often producing the strongest effects on 
eyewitness memory. The current study sought to analyze the impact of co-witness 
misinformation on memory for a traumatic event. Participants viewed a short film displaying a 
gruesome murder and completed an immediate recall test. After a short delay, participants read a 
narrative summary of the film (accurate or misleading), with some being told the narrative was 
written by another eyewitness. A subsequent recall test was given. Significant misinformation 
effects were found despite the traumatic nature of the film. The co-witness information did not 
impact recall of misleading items as expected. Implications for eyewitness memory for traumatic 









The Impact of Co-Witness Misinformation on Memory for a Traumatic Event  
Eyewitness Memory and the Misinformation Effect 
 Eyewitness memory is highly susceptible to error and influence. One way a witness’s 
memory for an event can be contaminated is through exposure to post-event information—or 
information that is encountered after an event. Within the eyewitness literature, there has been a 
particular focus on the effects of encountering inaccurate post-event information (i.e., 
misinformation), as this is a potentially serious cause of witness error. The act of reporting 
misinformation in place of the original information is known as the misinformation effect 
(Loftus, 1975).  
 The misinformation effect has been studied extensively over the past few decades and has 
revealed that misleading post-event information can be incorporated into an eyewitness’s 
memory for an event. The standard three-stage procedure typically used in involves showing 
participants a complex event and then exposing some of them to misinformation about the event. 
Participants are then asked to remember what they saw in the original event. The misinformation 
typically produces a robust impairment in memory, as participants often report the 
misinformation as being part of the original event. The distortion in memory caused by 
misinformation has been demonstrated in hundreds of studies involving a wide variety of 
materials. For instance, participants have erroneously recalled non-existent objects (e.g., broken 
glass at the scene of a car accident) as a result of misleading post-event information. Or they 
have been misled into remembering objects that were different than what they were actually 
shown (e.g., remembering a hammer as a screwdriver or a yield sign as a stop sign), or 
misremembering that large objects were part of a scene when, in reality, they were never present 
(Loftus, 2005).  
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 Further, in some cases, misleading post-event information has led to inaccurate memory 
for details related to simulated crimes. For instance, Loftus et al. (1989) showed participants a 
slide sequence depicting a burglary and then exposed them to a narrative that included 
misinformation or neutral information about critical details in the witnessed event. Participants 
were then tested on their memories of what they saw. Misinformation items were incorrectly 
selected as responses for 32% of the questions and participants reported feeling confident in 
making these incorrect choices. Similarly, Takarangi et al. (2006) showed participants a movie of 
a tradesman snooping around and stealing items inside a house. They then read a narrative 
describing the tradesman’s activities inside the house, which contained misinformation about 
critical items and neutral information about others. A recognition test revealed that participants’ 
responses were more accurate to questions about control items than to questions about misled 
items. Altogether, results from these studies indicate that exposure to post-event misinformation 
can lead to distortions in memory for details of a witnessed event. These findings have troubling 
implications for eyewitness memory, as actual eyewitnesses are routinely exposed to post-event 
information (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). 
 Theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect include the trace alteration theory 
(Loftus, 1975), which suggests the misinformation effect happens because the original memory 
is permanently lost and updated with misleading post-event information. Additionally, the 
memory coexistence and retrieval blocking account (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983) proposes that 
memories of the original information and misleading information co-exist. But retrieval of the 
original memory trace is blocked by retrieval of misinformation, which is a stronger and more 
recent trace. Further, the social-demand characteristics approach (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) 
focuses on how social-related factors contribute to accepting false information. In particular, 
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misleading suggestions may be reported because of social-demand characteristics that promote 
compliance from participants.  
The Impact of Co-Witness Information  
 Eyewitnesses can encounter post-event information about a crime in a few different 
ways. In some instances, witnesses may be asked questions about the event by police officers, 
lawyers, or friends. In other instances, they may encounter post-event information through media 
coverage of the event. Or, the post-event information may come from a co-witness. Co-witness 
information can either be passed directly from one eyewitness to another through a conversation, 
or indirectly through a third party, such as a police officer, who informs one witness about what 
another witness has said (Luus & Wells, 1994). Discussing a crime with a co-witness is worrying 
as it could lead to the transfer of misinformation. Indeed, research has indicated that the strongest 
misinformation effects are associated with co-witness misinformation compared to other sources 
of misinformation (Rivardo et al., 2013).  
For instance, in a series of three experiments, Shaw et al. (1997) compared the effects of 
co-witness information on memory with that of leading questions. In Experiment 1, the co-
witness information was presented as answers to questions about a highly publicized murder trial 
that were supposedly given by anonymous co-witnesses. In Experiments 2 and 3, the co-witness 
information came from a confederate posing as a witness. In all three experiments, misleading 
co-witness information produced larger detrimental effects on memory accuracy than leading 
questions. 
Additionally, Paterson and Kemp (2006) compared the impact of different methods of 
encountering post-event information on eyewitness memory. Participants were shown a video of 
a robbery and exposed to correct and incorrect post-event information through one of four 
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methods: leading questions, a mock newspaper report, a narrative supposedly written by another 
participant, or a discussion with a confederate trained to provide the post-event information. 
After a one-week delay, participants took a free recall test and a recognition test that included 
both true and false statements about details of the robbery. Results indicated that co-witness 
information had the strongest effect on memory, as participants were more likely to recall 
misleading post-event information encountered in the co-witness narrative and co-witness 
discussion. Additionally, those who received misleading post-event information through the co-
witness narrative and co-witness discussion were significantly less accurate on the recognition 
test. Altogether, these findings suggest that memory is more negatively impacted by misleading 
post-event information presented in co-witness situations. 
Similarly, Gabbert et al. (2004) compared the impact of different types of socially-
encountered misinformation on recall accuracy. In this study, participants viewed a video of a 
simulated robbery and then either read a narrative supposedly written by another eyewitness or 
discussed the video with a confederate. The narrative and discussion included both accurate 
information about the event and several items of misinformation. A cued recall test followed, 
which indicated that participants in the narrative and discussion conditions were more likely to 
report misinformation compared to the control condition. Additionally, participants were more 
influenced in the confederate discussion condition than the narrative condition, suggesting that 
encountering co-witness information through discussion may be more powerful than 
encountering it more indirectly through a co-witness narrative. The present study utilized a co-
witness narrative to examine the effects of co-witness misinformation on memory. Despite being 
a less powerful form of co-witness information compared to co-witness discussion, co-witness 
14 
narratives have successfully been able to elicit misinformation effects in prior studies so their use 
seems justified for the present study. 
Examining the effects of co-witness information on memory is important because 
eyewitness testimony should ideally be independent, and for this reason, legal procedures are 
designed to prevent eyewitnesses from discussing a crime with other witnesses. If witnesses 
discuss a crime, then their testimonies cannot be treated as independent observations (Paterson et 
al., 2009). Despite attempts to keep eyewitness testimony independent, witnesses reportedly do 
often talk to each other about an event. In fact, a survey of actual eyewitnesses found that when 
there was at least one other witness present at an event and of these, 86% reported that they 
discussed details of the event with their co-witness (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). 
Memory Conformity  
 As previously discussed, significant memory distortion can happen when co-witnesses 
are allowed to discuss an event prior to their memories being tested. This can result in ‘memory 
conformity’, where the individual memory report of one person becomes more similar to another 
person’s memory report following their discussion of an event. For instance, Gabbert et al. 
(2003) explored memory conformity effects between pairs of participants who viewed a 
simulated crime video. Participants were led to believe they saw the same video of a crime scene, 
but there were two versions filmed from different angles to simulate different witness 
perspectives. This allowed for different features to be observed by each participant. After 
viewing the film, participants recalled the event either alone or in pairs. An individual recall test 
was then given to see if co-witness discussion impacted memory reports. A substantial 
proportion (71%) of witnesses who discussed the event reported at least one erroneous detail 
acquired during the discussion with their co-witness.  
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Similarly, Wright et al. (2000) showed pairs of participants an identical crime, except that 
half saw an accomplice with the thief and half did not. Participants’ initial memories were very 
accurate, but after discussing the crime with the other person in the pair, who saw a slightly 
different sequence, a majority of participants exhibited memory conformity. The present study 
tested whether memory conformity occurred by comparing participants’ immediate recall of the 
witnessed event with their recall after being presented with misleading post-event information in 
the co-witness narrative.  
Memory Confidence 
 Another factor relevant to the discussion of eyewitness memory is subjective memory 
confidence. Many studies have examined the relationship between participants’ ratings of 
memory confidence and memory accuracy, as memory confidence judgments are generally 
considered to be an estimate of the accuracy of participants’ recollection (Roebers, 2002). 
Confidence is an important factor affecting perceptions of eyewitness credibility (Penrod & 
Cutler, 1995). Although it has been a matter of debate over the years, the now prevailing view is 
that there is a consistent positive, however not perfect, relationship between eyewitness 
confidence and recognition and recall accuracy (Gustafsson et al., 2019). Specifically, 
misinformed participants have been found to exhibit overconfidence in their incorrect responses 
compared to the responses of witnesses who did not receive misleading post-event information 
(Weingart et al., 1994). Or, misinformed participants may show as much confidence in their 
correct responses as they do to their incorrect responses to misleading questions (Loftus et al., 
1989).  
 The presence of co-witness information also tends to inflate confidence in memory 
accuracy, especially in participants who receive misleading post-event information. Paterson and 
Kemp (2006) found that those in co-witness information conditions reported higher levels of 
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confidence in incorrect responses that were based on misleading post-event information. 
Similarly, Goodwin et al. (2017) found that participants who received misleading post-event 
information from a co-witness were significantly more confident in their recall of questions 
based on misleading post-event information than questions based on neutral information. Taken 
together, these increased confidence levels suggest that participants in co-witness information 
conditions are more likely to believe misleading post-event information to be true when in reality 
it is not.   
Memory for Central vs. Peripheral Details 
 The type of information presented can also affect how well a person may remember that 
information (i.e., central vs. peripheral details). Central details are specifically connected to the 
source of emotional arousal while peripheral details are less relevant to the main source of 
emotional arousal. For example, in observing a car accident, recognizing which car instigated the 
accident, the intersection of the accident, and the number of cars involved may be considered 
central details. On the other hand, the colors of the cars and the demographics of the drivers 
would most likely be considered peripheral details. Studies comparing memory for central and 
peripheral details typically suggest the more emotionally arousing the stimulus is, the greater 
retention a person tends to have for central details (Christianson et al., 1991), whereas details 
peripheral to the main stressor are usually less accurately remembered (Loftus & Burns, 1982). 
Some findings are contradictory to this, however, suggesting that the differential recall of central 
and peripheral details for emotionally arousing events has not been consistent over similarly 
replicated studies. However, the bulk of the published literature does tend to support a stronger 
memory for central over peripheral details, especially for emotionally arousing events (Wessel et 
al., 2010). 
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Eyewitness Memory for Traumatic Events 
 The data on memory accuracy for highly negative emotional stimuli are somewhat 
contradictory. Several field and laboratory studies have suggested that information eliciting a 
strongly negative emotional reaction tends to be remembered with greater accuracy (Bernsten & 
Thomsen, 2005; Christianson, 1992). Additionally, when an event is highly distressing, the main 
stressor tends to be better remembered due to heightened pre-attentive processes and greater 
rehearsal and consolidation (Christianson, 1992). By contrast, other research has suggested that 
peripheral details in a stressful event are less accurately remembered compared to neutral events 
(Loftus & Burns, 1982). However, it is possible that these studies have not included events that 
are sufficiently traumatic, so memory interference is not actually experienced (Deffenbacher et 
al., 2004).  
 The debate about distress and memory is relevant to the question of whether stressful and 
traumatic events are somehow immune to the misinformation effect. If features of highly 
negative events are retained with greater accuracy, then they may be resistant to misleading post-
event information. Relatively few studies have examined the effects of misinformation on these 
types of events. Porter et al. (2003) showed participants highly positive or highly negative 
emotional photographs or neutral photographs, followed by misinformation. The misinformation 
more adversely impacted recall for misleading peripheral details compared to central details.  
 Additionally, in a particularly compelling demonstration, Morgan et al. (2013) found that 
misinformation can impact memory for a highly stressful personal event. Military personnel 
were confined for 72 hours in a very stressful mock POW camp as part of their survival school 
training. After being “captured” during a wilderness evasion, the officers were subjected to an 
intense interrogation, isolation, and the presentation of group propaganda. After the camp 
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concluded, some received misinformation about details and events they had experienced. Others 
were exposed to a misleading photograph while they were in isolation. A memory assessment 
followed and showed that memory for the details of the event was negatively affected by the 
presentation of misinformation. Further, those exposed to the misleading photograph were more 
likely to falsely identify the interrogator after the interrogation was over. These findings 
demonstrate that memories for highly stressful events can be prone to change by exposure to 
misinformation. 
 Finally, Paz-Alonso and Goodman (2008) and Paz-Alonso et al. (2013) utilized the 
classic three-stage misinformation paradigm to determine whether misinformation affects 
memory for a highly negative event. Participants viewed a distressing film and then read either a 
misleading or an accurate narrative about the film. A recognition test followed and revealed a 
significant misinformation effect, which further suggests that memory is not immune to 
inaccuracies and suggestive influences, even for a highly negative event.  
The Present Study 
Bringing these areas together, the present study examined the impact of co-witness 
misinformation on memory for a traumatic event. Memory confidence and centrality of 
information were additional variables of interest. In the present study, participants viewed a 
gruesome film and took an immediate recall test to assess initial memory accuracy. After a short 
delay, participants were presented with a misleading narrative or an accurate narrative. Some 
participants were told the narrative was a recounting of the film’s events from another 
eyewitness and others did receive this co-witness information. Finally, the same recall test was 
given to assess post-manipulation memory accuracy. Based on previous findings, the following 
predictions were made:  
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 A) Misinformation effects will be replicated, even for a highly negative event. Although 
eyewitness memory has been studied for years using the misinformation effect paradigm, 
relatively few studies have examined such effects for traumatic acts, such as murder. Confirming 
whether memory for highly negative events is immune to inaccuracies and suggestive influences 
is important since controversy exists regarding the generalizability of misinformation effect 
findings to traumatic material (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008). Consistent with classic 
misinformation effects, misinformed participants are expected to report misinformation more 
frequently than control participants. Thus, misinformation effects are predicted despite the 
traumatic nature of the witnessed event.  
 B) Co-witness misinformation effects will occur, even for a highly negative event. Prior 
studies on co-witness misinformation have predominantly utilized eyewitness events involving 
less serious crimes (e.g., theft or robbery), so nothing is known regarding the potential impact of 
co-witness misinformation on memory for more serious, violent crimes (e.g., murder). It is 
uncertain whether participants will be as susceptible to co-witness misinformation for a more 
serious, violent crime. In particular, it is possible that the highly negative event will be better 
remembered, and therefore that participants will be less susceptible to co-witness 
misinformation. On the other hand, it is also possible that participants will be just as susceptible 
to co-witness misinformation even for a highly negative event, given the strong nature of co-
witness misinformation effects. Furthermore, given that actual eyewitnesses have reported 
discussing more serious, violent crimes with other co-witnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2006), more 
information is needed about how co-witness misinformation may impact memory for highly 
negative events.  
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Similar to prior co-witness information studies, participants in the co-witness information 
condition are expected to report more misinformation during recall than those in the control 
condition. Since co-witness information has consistently been found to have a powerful effect on 
subsequent memory, these findings are still expected despite the traumatic nature of the 
witnessed event. 
 C) The presence of misinformation and co-witness information will increase confidence 
in misleading post-event information. Prior research has indicated that post-event misinformation 
and co-witness information impact memory confidence. The present study sought to replicate 
prior findings by comparing confidence judgments between those in the misinformation and 
control conditions and those in the co-witness information and control conditions. The present 
study sought to extend memory confidence findings by examining confidence in memories for a 
highly negative event in participants that are exposed to co-witness misinformation. 
Based on evidence from misinformation studies, it is expected that misinformed 
participants will exhibit as much confidence in their correct responses to neutral questions as 
they do in their incorrect responses to misinformation questions (Loftus et al., 1989). Further, 
with respect to the impact of co-witness information on confidence, participants in the co-witness 
information condition are expected to be more confident in both their correct responses to neutral 









In total, there were 232 undergraduate student participants (75 males and 157 females), 
ranging in age from 17 years to 32 years (M = 19.42 years). Most participants were freshmen 
(38.8%) and sophomores (32.3%), while 20.3% were juniors and 8.6% were seniors. Participants 
were 81.5% Caucasian, 11.2% Latino/Hispanic, 4.3% Asian American, 1.3% African American, 
and 1.7% “Other.” All participants were compensated for their participation in the form of class 
credit toward their undergraduate psychology courses. 
Materials 
Demographic Questionnaire 
In order to obtain demographic information to characterize the sample, participants were 
asked to complete a demographic questionnaire. The questionnaire asked them to provide data 
regarding their age, gender, ethnicity, and years of education. Additionally, two questions 
pertained to the film itself: Whether participants were familiar with the film prior to the study 
(none reported to be familiar with the film) and how distressing participants found the film to be 
on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all distressing) to 7 (very distressing). Analyses indicated that 
the film was judged to sufficiently distressing, but not overly distressing (M = 3.84, SD = 1.73).  
Eyewitness Stimulus Film 
A clip of a murder event obtained from Kieslowski’s film “Decalogue V: A Short Film 
About Killing” (Chutkowski & Kieslowski, 1988) was used for the witnessed event. The clip has 
been used in prior studies (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008; Paz-Alonso et al., 2013) and was 
found to successfully elicit misinformation effects for a traumatic event. The entire clip was 10 
minutes in length, with a 2.5-minute introduction, a 5 minute 30 second emotional climax, and a 
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2-minute ending. From the introduction, a young man is traveling in a taxicab and the driver 
stops at a crosswalk to allow a group of children and an adult pass by. The cab continues to the 
edge of town before the young man abruptly begins strangling the taxi driver with a rope and 
then proceeds to repeatedly hit him with a metal rod. After dragging the body to a nearby lake, 
the young man bashes the taxi driver over the head with a large rock, ultimately killing him. The 
ending of the clip displays the young man sitting in the cab, calmly listening to the radio after 
committing the murder. 
Narrative Texts 
Two forms of a narrative text summarized the film clip (see Appendix A and B). The 
misleading narrative included items of misinformation regarding the details in the clip (e.g., “The 
young man strangled the driver with a chain”, when in fact, it was with rope), while the neutral 
narrative summarized the clip accurately (e.g., “The young man strangled the driver with a 
rope”). The narrative texts were presented to the participants as either a general narrative of the 
clip written by the researchers or a general narrative of the clip written by a hypothetical co-
witness who had previously watched the same clip.  
Filler Tasks 
A series of filler tasks were used in both phases of the experiment (in between viewing 
the film and the initial recall, and in between reading the narrative and the post-manipulation 
recall). Participants were asked to answer general knowledge questions and complete the word 
length effect task as a measure of working memory. Analyses indicated that working memory 
task performance mostly followed a normal distribution (M = 70.81, SD = 9.95). 
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Cued Recall Test 
 The present study utilized cued recall to assess memory accuracy. To date, fewer studies 
have used more open-ended questioning procedures to examine the misinformation effect. 
Compared to recognition tests, recall tests are preferable as they are more similar to actual 
eyewitness interviews and recall situations. 
A cued recall test was created based on the eyewitness stimulus film (see Appendix C). 
Some of the questions were “misinformation questions” that were related to the misinformation 
items presented in the misleading narrative. The remaining questions were “neutral questions” 
that were related to details from the film. The test was given to participants both before (Recall 
1) and after (Recall 2) the manipulation phase. Participants were able to answer “I don’t know” 
or “I don’t remember” to any of the questions for which they could not recall or answer. 
Allowing participants the option to say “I don’t know” is important for memory accuracy (Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1994). Additionally, witnesses can provide “don’t know” answers in forensic 
contexts, which are clearly preferable to an incorrect answer (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).  
Participants were additionally asked to provide a confidence rating (1 = “low confidence” 
and 6 = “high confidence”) for each item on the cued recall test for which they provided an 
answer other than “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember”.  
Manipulation Check 
A questionnaire was developed to determine whether participants in the experimental 
conditions were aware of the experimental manipulation. In particular, they were asked whether 
they had discussed the film or study with anyone else who had participated in the experiment and 
what they thought the purpose of the experiment was. Any participants who reported discussing 
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specific details of the study with others or that guessed the correct purpose of the study were not 
included in the data analyses. 
Procedure 
Participants were run either individually or in small groups. Each participant session 
began with the experimenter informing participants that they would be watching a video 
depicting a gruesome murder. Participants were warned that some scenes might cause discomfort 
and that they are free to leave the room if desired.  
Following similar procedures used in eyewitness memory studies (i.e., Gabbert et al., 
2004), immediately after watching the film, participants had 10 minutes to complete the working 
memory filler task. Then participants completed the cued recall test to assess initial memory 
accuracy. Another 20 minutes of filler tasks followed and then the manipulation was introduced. 
In particular, participants were asked to read through a post-event narrative containing a 
summary of the events in the film. Those in the misleading narrative conditions read a version 
that contained items of misinformation embedded within the narrative (e.g., “The driver pulls 
onto a paved road uphill from the river”, when in reality, he pulled onto a dirt road downhill next 
to the river). Those in the control narrative conditions read the same version of the narrative, but 
with accurate items instead of misleading items. Participants in the co-witness information 
conditions were told that the post-event narrative was an account of the events from the film 
given by another eyewitness. In response to any questions about the accuracy of the account, the 
experimenters re-iterated that the narrative was simply another eyewitness’s account and that no 
further information could be provided (Gabbert et al., 2004). Participants in the no co-witness 
information conditions did not receive the co-witness information instructions prior to reading 
the narrative. 
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After reading the narrative, participants engaged in filler tasks for another 20 minutes 
before being given the cued recall test for a second time. Finally, the manipulation check was 
given. Participants were then asked to complete the final demographic questionnaire and were 
debriefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with other potential participants. 
Results 
Initial Overall Recall Accuracy 
Participants completed the 18-item cued recall test as a measure of initial recall accuracy 
for the events in the film. The initial recall test took place 10 minutes after viewing the film and 
completing a filler task. To compare differences in initial recall accuracy between the different 
conditions, a two-way ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of misinformation was 
nonsignificant, indicating that initial accuracy for the film details was not significantly different 
for the misinformation and control conditions (F (1, 232) = .237, p =.246). However, the main 
effect of co-witness information was significant (F (1, 232) = 6.479, p = .009). Follow-up 
Bonferroni comparisons revealed that those in the co-witness information condition were 
initially less accurate than those in the no co-witness information condition. Further, the 
misinformation x co-witness information interaction was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 1.170, p 
=.645). 
Initial Recall Accuracy: Central vs. Peripheral Details 
Half of the items on the recall test included central details and half included peripheral 
details. Initial recall accuracy differences for these details were compared between the different 
groups. A two-way ANOVA was conducted for initial peripheral detail accuracy and found no 
significant main effects (misinformation: (F (1, 232) = 1.510, p =.470); co-witness information: 
(F (1, 232) = 3.146, p =.126) and no significant interaction (misinformation x co-witness 
26 
information: F (1, 232) = 1.947, p = .565). A two-way ANOVA was conducted for initial central 
detail accuracy and found a significant main effect for co-witness information (F (1, 232) = 
4.748, p = .040). Follow-up Bonferroni comparisons revealed the no co-witness information 
group initially correctly recalled more central details than the co-witness information group. The 
main effect for misinformation was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = .688, p = .255), nor was the 
misinformation x co-witness information interaction (F (1, 232) = .075, p = .595).  
Initial differences in overall recall accuracy between the co-witness information and no 
co-witness information groups were not anticipated. Ideally, initial recall accuracy would have 
been statistically equivalent between all groups. To control for the potential effects of these 
initial differences on post-manipulation recall, a series of ANCOVAs were performed on each of 
the post-manipulation recall analyses, with overall initial recall accuracy as the covariate.  
Post-Manipulation Overall Recall Accuracy 
Participants completed the 18-item cued recall test a second time after the manipulation 
(i.e., after either receiving the co-witness information or not, followed by reading either the 
accurate or misleading narrative). To compare differences in post-manipulation overall recall 
accuracy between the different conditions, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted, controlling for 
overall initial recall accuracy. The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 
54.490, p < .001) and follow-up Bonferroni comparisons showed that overall post-manipulation 
recall accuracy was significantly higher in the control condition compared to the misinformation 
condition. Additionally, the main effect of co-witness information was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) 
= 2.224, p = .137), indicating that post-manipulation overall recall accuracy was not significantly 
different for the co-witness information and non-co-witness information groups. Finally, the co-
witness information x misinformation interaction was significant (F (1, 232) = 6.258, p = .013). 
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An analysis of simple effects indicated the co-witness misinformation group had significantly 
lower overall post-manipulation recall accuracy than the no co-witness misinformation group (F 
(1, 116) = 7.990, p = .005).  
Post-Manipulation Accuracy: Central vs. Peripheral Details 
 To compare post-manipulation recall accuracy for peripheral items between the different 
conditions, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted, controlling for initial overall recall accuracy. 
The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 19.386, p < .001) and follow-up 
Bonferroni comparisons indicated misinformed participants recalled fewer peripheral items 
accurately compared to control participants. The main effect for co-witness information was 
nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 1.342, p = .248), so peripheral item recall accuracy did not differ for 
the co-witness information and control conditions. The co-witness information x misinformation 
interaction was also nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 2.433, p = .120).  
 To compare post-manipulation recall accuracy for central items between the different 
conditions, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted, controlling for initial overall recall accuracy. 
The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 33.734, p < .001) and follow-up 
Bonferroni comparisons revealed misinformed participants recalled fewer central items 
accurately compared to control participants. The main effect for co-witness information was 
nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 1.441, p = .231), so central item recall accuracy did not differ for the 
co-witness information and control conditions. The co-witness information x misinformation 
interaction was also significant (F (1, 232) = 4.281, p = .040). An analysis of simple effects 
found the co-witness misinformation group recalled significantly more central details accurately 
than the no co-witness misinformation group (F (1, 116) = 5.357, p = .005) 
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Misinformation Effects (Post-Manipulation Misleading Item Recall) 
To examine differences in recall accuracy based on the presence of misinformation, a 
two-way ANCOVA was performed comparing recall of misleading items between the 
misinformation and control conditions, while controlling for overall initial recall accuracy. 
Results indicated a significant misinformation effect, with those in the misinformation condition 
reporting more misleading items than those in the control condition (F (1, 232) = 56.677, p < 
.001).  
Co-Witness Misinformation Effects (Post-Manipulation Misleading Item Recall) 
The same two-way ANCOVA compared recall of misleading items between the co-
witness information and no co-witness information conditions. The main effect of co-witness 
information was significant (F (1, 232) = 5.008, p = .026), indicating that recall of misleading 
items was significantly lower in the co-witness information condition compared to the no co-
witness information condition.  
Further, there was a significant co-witness information x misinformation interaction (F (1, 
232) = 7.250, p = .008), indicating that misleading item recall differed significantly between co-
witness misinformation participants and non-co-witness misinformation participants. However, 
the direction of the co-witness misinformation effect was the reverse of what was expected—an 
analysis of simple effects confirmed participants exposed to co-witness misinformation reported 
significantly fewer misleading items than participants exposed to misinformation and no co-
witness information (F (1, 116), = 12.204, p = .005). Table 1 displays the average misleading 





Post-Manipulation Misinformation Mean Item Recall (Accuracy) 
 Accurate Misleading Total 
Co-
Witness 
5.79 (0.49) 5.02 (1.4) 5.39 (1.22) 
Non-Co-
Witness 
5.93 (0.26) 4.46* 
(1.92) 
5.19 (1.56) 
Total 5.86 (0.4) 4.74* (1.7)  
 
Co-Witness Information Effects (Post-Manipulation Correct Item Recall) 
 To look at whether the presence of co-witness information impacted correct item recall, a 
two-way ANCOVA was conducted. The main effect of co-witness information was significant 
(F (1, 232) = 7.466, p = .007) and follow-up Bonferroni comparisons revealed that participants 
receiving co-witness information recalled fewer correct items than participants who did not 
receive co-witness information, suggesting that the co-witness information did not aid in the 
recall of accurate items. The main effect of misinformation was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 
2.784, p = .097), indicating that misinformed and non-misinformed participants were similar in 
their recall of correct items on the post-manipulation recall test. The misinformation x co-witness 
information interaction was also nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = .613, p =.434). 
Confidence for Correct Items and Misleading Items 
 To compare confidence in post-manipulation recall of correct items between the different 
conditions, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted, controlling for initial overall recall accuracy. 
The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 14.901, p < .001), and follow-up 
Bonferroni comparisons indicate that average confidence for correct items was significantly 
lower for the misinformation condition than the control condition. Further, the main effect of co-
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witness information was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = .840, p =.360) indicating that average 
confidence for correct items did not differ between the co-witness information and control 
conditions. Finally, the co-witness information x misinformation interaction was also 
nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 2.782, p =.097).  
 To compare confidence in post-manipulation recall of misleading items between the 
different conditions, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted. A significant main effect for 
misinformation emerged (F (1, 232) = 23.375, p < .001) and follow-up Bonferroni comparisons 
indicated that the misinformation participants were significantly less confident in their recall of 
misleading items than the control participants. The main effect of co-witness information was 
nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = .911, p =.911), as was the misinformation x co-witness information 
interaction (F (1, 232) = .194, p =.194). Table 2 displays the average misleading item confidence 
for the misinformation and control conditions and the co-witness information and control 
conditions. 
Table 2 
Post-Manipulation Misinformation Mean Item Recall (Confidence) 
 Accurate Misleading Total 
Co-
Witness 
5.69 (0.4) 5.36 (0.71) 5.54 (0.6) 
Non-Co-
Witness 
5.81 (0.35) 5.36 (0.86) 5.58 (0.7) 
Total 5.75* 
(0.38) 
5.38 (0.79)  
Confidence for Post-Manipulation Recall of Central and Peripheral Details 
 To compare confidence in post-manipulation recall of central details between the 
different groups, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted, controlling for initial overall recall 
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accuracy. The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 14.286, p < .001), and 
follow-up Bonferroni comparisons indicate that average confidence for post-manipulation central 
detail recall was significantly lower in the misinformation condition than the control condition. 
Further, the main effect of co-witness information was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = .512, p 
=.475), as was the co-witness x misinformation interaction (F (1, 232) = 3.71, p =.543). 
  To compare confidence in post-manipulation recall of peripheral details between the 
different groups, a two-way ANCOVA was performed, controlling for initial overall recall 
accuracy. The main effect of misinformation was significant (F (1, 232) = 15.662, p < .001), and 
follow-up Bonferroni comparisons indicate that average confidence for post-manipulation 
peripheral detail recall was significantly lower in the misinformation condition than the control 
condition. Further, the main effect of co-witness information was nonsignificant (F (1, 232) = 
.246, p =.620), but the co-witness x misinformation interaction was significant (F (1, 232) = 
5.983, p=.015). An analysis of simple effects revealed that the no co-witness misinformation 
group was significantly less confident in peripheral detail recall than the no co-witness, no 
misinformation group (F (1, 116) = 15.662, p = .005). 
Discussion 
 The present study sought to replicate and extend the current eyewitness memory literature 
by examining whether co-witness misinformation impacts recall for traumatic events. As 
hypothesized, the present study replicated misinformation effects for a distressing film 
concerning a murder (i.e., Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008; Paz-Alonso et al., 2013), further 
confirming that even traumatic events are not immune to the effects of misinformation. After 
being exposed to misleading post-event information, misled participants in the present study had 
significantly lower overall recall accuracy for both central and peripheral items These results are 
32 
consistent with research showing that details of stressful events may be less accurately 
remembered than comparable details for neutral events—especially when the details are 
peripheral in nature (Loftus & Burns, 1982; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008). Further, misled 
participants recalled significantly more misleading items and were less confident in their recall 
of correct items. These findings are consistent with other studies that have found misinformation 
effects for traumatic events (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008; Paz-Alonso, Goodman, & Ibabe, 
2013). 
 The present study was the first known study to examine how co-witness misinformation 
potentially impacts memory for a traumatic event. Given that co-witness discussion is common 
among actual eyewitnesses, especially for highly violent events (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008), 
more information about how co-witness misinformation potentially impacts eyewitness memory 
for these types of crimes seems relevant. Contrary to what was hypothesized, findings did not 
reveal co-witness misinformation adversely affected recall of a traumatic event. Rather, the co-
witness information manipulation had the opposite effect for the misled participants—the co-
witness misinformation group reported significantly fewer misleading items than the no co-
witness misinformation group. Prior studies using narratives to present co-witness 
misinformation have reported more misleading item recall in co-witness misinformation groups 
(Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Gabbert et al., 2004). However, these studies also acknowledged that 
the narratives were less powerful forms of co-witness influence compared to co-witness 
discussion. Therefore, co-witness misinformation effects may not have been found in the present 
study simply because the manipulation was not powerful enough. 
Furthermore, the co-witness information manipulation may have created suspicion in the 
co-witness misinformation participants, leading them to report fewer misleading items than the 
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no co-witness misinformation participants. It seems plausible that describing the narrative as a 
recounting from another eyewitness led participants to think more carefully about what they 
actually remembered from the film, and in turn, they may have resisted reporting more 
misleading items from the narrative. Similarly, the co-witness misinformation group recalled 
significantly more central details than the no co-witness misinformation group—further 
demonstrating the unexpected performance benefits the co-witness information appeared to 
provide. Again, it is possible the co-witness information prompted these participants to more 
carefully attend to the narrative or think more carefully about what they actually remembered 
from the film, so they ended up remembering more of the central details and reporting fewer of 
the misleading items, despite being exposed to the misleading narrative. Further, the co-witness 
information group recalled significantly fewer correct items and had lower overall post-
manipulation recall accuracy than the no co-witness information group, so there was no benefit 
of co-witness information for correct recall either. Prior studies utilizing co-witness information 
narratives have reported improved recall for correct details (Paterson & Kemp, 2006), which 
further points to the co-witness information manipulation not being as effective in the present 
study.   
 Past research has typically found that misled participants report as much confidence in 
their memory judgments as non-misled participants (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). Contrary to what 
was expected, participants in the present study were not highly confident in the recall of their 
misinformed responses. Despite reporting significantly more misleading items, the misinformed 
participants were not as confident in misleading item recall as control participants—nor were 
they as confident in their recall of both central and peripheral details. It is possible that the 
shorter time delay between the event, the manipulation, and the post-manipulation recall may 
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have contributed to lower misleading item recall confidence. In particular, prior research (Mudd 
& Govern, 2004; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008) has found that misled participants tend to 
become more confident in their memories after longer delays (e.g., 1 – 2 weeks). With the 
shorter time delay in the present study, the initial memory trace may have remained relatively 
strong, and as a result, participants may not have felt as confident in their misleading item recall 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1995).  
 A number of theoretical approaches have been put forth to explain how and why the 
misinformation effect happens. While true memory impairment and source monitoring errors 
may explain why some participants fell prey to the misinformation, other explanations are worth 
mentioning as well. The blocking hypothesis assumes that exposure to incorrect information (i.e., 
misleading PEI) impairs access to correct information (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983). At the time of 
test, traces for both the original and misleading items are believed to exist in memory, and the 
more recent trace may block access to the earlier trace. Indeed, some participants in the present 
study reported having memories for both the correct details from the film and the misleading 
details in the narrative, but nonetheless still reported misleading items. It is possible that the 
misleading information blocked access to (or interfered with) the trace for the earlier 
information. Additionally, the strategic effects account explains the misinformation effect in 
terms of factors other than true memory impairment, such as task demands (McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985). In these cases, participants may remember both the original and misleading 
information but choose to report the items from the misleading narrative to produce results they 
believe the experimenter wants. The fact that the co-witness misinformation participants reported 
significantly fewer misleading items suggests that some may have been aware of the 
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manipulation on some level—and some may have decided to report misleading items due to 
experimenter demands rather than true memory impairment.  
 In addition to the weak co-witness information manipulation, other limitations 
undoubtedly impacted the findings in the present study. Some students reported finding the film 
clip to be especially distressing, which may have led them to not fully focus on the event and 
miss crucial details. Indeed, prior research has suggested that too much distress can impair 
memory for an event (Paz-Alonso et al., 2013). Further, many of the participant sessions took 
place near the end of the semester when student stress, anxiety, and apathy were all likely high. 
While this is a common occurrence in undergraduate student populations, it is particularly 
problematic for research assessing memory performance. Additionally, the short time delay 
between the witnessed event and recall may have contributed to weaker co-witness information 
effects. Previous research utilizing longer one- to two-week time delays between event and recall 
found significant co-witness misinformation effects (Paterson, Kemp, & Forgas, 2009; Rivardo 
et al., 2013). Finally, the film clip itself may not have been particularly engaging or relatable to 
participants. A more updated realistic simulated traumatic event (as opposed to a clip from a 
decades-old foreign film) may be more relevant and capture greater interest and attention. 
 In addition to correcting for the aforementioned limitations, future research could utilize 
a confederate as the source of post-event co-witness misinformation. As previously discussed, 
stronger co-witness misinformation effects have been found when a trained confederate is used 
to supply the co-witness misinformation via discussion, compared to when it is supplied in a 
post-event narrative (Gabbert et al., 2004; Paterson & Kemp, 2006). Post-event information 
encountered through co-witness discussion is likely stronger due to the presence of subtle non-
verbal and social cues that may lead to memory conformity (e.g., eye contact, facial expressions, 
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perceived credibility and trustworthiness, etc.). Additionally, people generally assume 
information exchanged during a discussion is accurate and truthful and may choose to agree with 
others to appear more likeable (Gabbert et al., 2004). 
Overall, findings from the present study suggest that witnesses are prone to reporting 
misleading details about a witnessed event, even when the event is traumatic in nature. These 
inaccuracies extend to both central and peripheral details for the event. Further, despite not 
finding co-witness misinformation effects, the need for investigators to engage in practices that 
prevent co-witnesses from discussing the details of an event with each other is still critical. 
Unfortunately, officers cannot and do not always engage in practices to limit co-witness 
discussion, and in some cases, they actually encourage co-witness discussion (Paterson & Kemp, 
2005). This is troubling, as the presentation of inaccurate co-witness information could lead to 
the transfer of misinformation, which could then be incorporated into a witness’ memories 
(Gabbert et al., 2003). Several real-life examples illustrate how co-witness discussions have led 
to mistaken eyewitness identifications, and these mistaken identifications have had severe 
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Accurate Narrative  
It is a dark and dreary day. A young, blonde-haired man is riding in a taxi cab, seated 
in the back of the car directly behind the driver. The car briefly stops to allow a group of 
children and an adult to cross the intersection. The interaction between the young man and the 
taxi driver is minimal as the ride continues through the city. Before the car comes to a stop, the 
young man abruptly begins strangling the taxi driver with a rope. As the car comes to a stop, the 
driver pulls onto a muddy road downhill from a river. Shortly thereafter, a man riding a 
bicycle passes by on a nearby hill. The taxi driver then begins honking the car horn. The young 
man eventually stops strangling the taxi driver and gets out of the car. As a train passes by in the 
distance, the young man begins to hit the taxi driver several times with a metal rod. The young 
man then takes a tarp out of the trunk of the car and covers the taxi driver’s head with it. The 
young man moves the car closer to the river and drags the taxi driver down the hill. The young 
man then bashes the taxi driver’s head, ultimately killing him. Following the murder, the young 






















Misleading Narrative  
It is a dark and dreary day. A young, dark-haired man is riding in a taxi cab, seated in 
the back of the car on the opposite side of the driver. The car briefly stops to allow a group of 
children and an adult to cross the intersection. The interaction between the young man and the 
taxi driver is minimal as the ride continues through the city. Before the car comes to a stop, the 
young man abruptly begins strangling the taxi driver with a chain. As the car comes to a stop, 
the driver pulls onto a paved road uphill from a river. Shortly thereafter, a man riding a 
bicycle passes by on a nearby hill. The taxi driver then begins honking the car horn. The young 
man eventually stops strangling the taxi driver and gets out of the car. As a train passes by in the 
distance, the young man begins to hit the taxi driver several times with a metal rod. The young 
man then takes a blanket out of the trunk of the car and covers the taxi driver’s head with it. The 
young man moves the car closer to the river and drags the taxi driver down the hill. The young 
man then bashes the taxi driver’s head, ultimately killing him. Following the murder, the young 






















Cued Recall Test 
1. What were the weather conditions like?   P, A 
2. What color hair was the young man’s hair? C, M 
3. What color was the sweater the young man was wearing? C 
4. Where was the young man seated in the taxi? P, M 
5. Describe the pedestrians that are shown crossing the road. P, A 
6. Describe the degree of interaction between the young man and the taxi driver.  P, A 
7. What did the young man use to strangle the taxi driver?  C, M 
8. Which article(s) of clothing did the taxi driver remove?  P 
9. What type of road did the taxi driver pull onto before stopping the car?  P, M 
10. What type of animal was shown during the clip?  P  
11. What was the man doing as he passed by on the nearby hill?  P, A 
12. What noise was coming from the car during the strangulation?  C, A 
13. What does the young man hit the taxi driver with while in the car? C, A 
14. What does the taxi driver lose after being hit over the head in the car?  C  
15. What does the young man use to cover the taxi driver’s head?  C, M 
16. Where does the young man move the taxi driver’s body? C, A 
17. What was the taxi driver hit over the head with outside of the car? C 
18. What is the young man shown doing following the murder? P, M 
19. Can you remember any other details you want to add about the scene? 
C=Central Detail P=Peripheral Detail A=Accurate detail M=Misleading detail 
 
 
